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The threat by Russian authorities to introduce a visa regime and a ban on trade, 
financial transfers and air travel with Azerbaijan has shocked the Azeri 
community, which views this as a new step in an existing pattern of prejudice and 
pressure. This campaign of ethnic intimidation aims at two related goals: creating 
an obedient, frightened minority from which bribes can be extorted easily, and 
achieving political popularity among Russians by means of “keeping the blacks 
down.” The third and external objective is to pressure the Azeri government into 
concessions on a variety of issues.  
 
The Chechen conflict and official propaganda have added a new twist to 
traditional Russian prejudice toward peoples from the Caucasus. Thus, his 
consideration of additional punitive policies further increased Prime Minister 
Vladimir Putin's popularity among a majority of Russian citizens, just as Moscow 
Mayor Yuri Luzhkov has garnered a great deal of popular support by 
implementing an especially heavy-handed policy toward minorities. Luzhkov “is 
hunting down Caucasians, has turned Moscow into a screening camp, and is 
eliciting a chauvinistic wave in this multinational state,” according to Samara 
Governor Konstantin Titov. (Novye izvestiya, 25 Sep 99; Middle East News Items, 
via lexis-nexis)  
 
The sudden influx into Russia of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Azeris, starting 
in the late 1980s, was the result of two related processes: the Armenian-
Azerbaijani war over Nagorno-Karabakh and economic deterioration in 
 2 
Azerbaijan. Russia was the natural destination due to its geographical proximity, 
unrestricted access and social and cultural familiarity. Now there are about 2 
million ethnic Azeris living in Russia (most of them in Moscow) who have become 
an urban minority -- a new phenomenon in ethnic dynamics for post-Soviet 
Russia, which previously had faced mostly territorial aspects of ethnic relations. 
In some cases, such ethnic-territorial problems were peacefully negotiated (i.e., 
Tatarstan) while other conflicts became very violent (i.e., Chechnya). The urban 
minority issue, therefore, presents an unfamiliar dilemma for the new Russian 
state, which at this point has opted for a policy of police repression. In economic 
terms, most Azeris in Russia filled a niche as small retail traders/street vendors, 
not a profession particularly favored by Russians. The nature of this profession 
leads to daily encounters with an economically vulnerable Russian population, 
unhappy with high prices, so that Azeris are often accused of ''profiteering'' 
(spekuliatsia), when they sell goods at a price which seems too high. However, 
high prices are the result of constant bribery of -- and extortion by -- the police, 
while traders take the blame. [Nor is extortion limited to officials. In October, 
Azeri traders at a Russian market were attacked by carloads of Russian men 
wielding iron bars. According to one of the traders, the assault stemmed from the 
traders’ refusal to pay inflated entrance fees (raised from 172 to 1,400 rubles). 
(The Moscow Times, 14 Oct 99; via lexis-nexis)]  
 
Indeed, street vendors are easy prey for police and other officials. Some estimate 
that Azeri traders and businesses pay the equivalent of about US$200 million 
each month as tax payment, fees, registration, etc. (Compatriot newspaper, Jan 
99) The amount of bribes is often equal to the taxes paid. In any case, even by 
conservative estimates, the total extorted from the Azeri community in Moscow 
alone reaches millions of US dollars each month -- a very large amount by 
Russian standards.  
 
The Azeris are politically vulnerable because they lack representation in 
governing organs that could protect them from the police. Currently, there are 
 3 
attempts to create some kind of organizational structures for self-protection; 
however, this is unlikely to be successful in the face of governmental repression. 
Moreover, there is a fear that anything beyond a purely cultural association may 
be labeled a "terrorist" organization. Thus, the September 1999 issue of the 
popular weekly newspaper Versiya, featured an article that called the only high 
school in Moscow with some Azeri curriculum a potential terrorist training camp.  
 
Economic pressure is combined with other forms of repression, such as police 
brutality and racial targeting (profiling). Besides rounding up dozens of vendors 
on the open markets and conducting strip searches without a warrant or probable 
cause, such repression often includes confiscation of goods and willful 
destruction of legally obtained residence documents. (Segodnya, 18 Sep 99) 
Indeed, reports of police harrassment of Caucasian peoples in Moscow have 
become commonplace. (The Scotsman, 19 Nov 99) The absence of a sound 
judicial system and the vulnerable immigrant status force the Azeri minority in 
Russia to keep a low profile and to avoid seeking recourse from Russian courts.  
 
The situation has worsened since the Chechen war began, as ethnic minorities 
from the Caucasus are often identified as a potential source of terrorist activity. 
During security sweeps this fall, following the spate of bombings, more than 
20,000 persons were detained, a majority of whom were dark-skinned. However, 
even in normal times, “police officers routinely stop individuals to check their 
documents; overwhelmingly, they are darker-skinned people (typical of the 
Caucasus region) known in Russia as ‘blacks.’” (Inter Press Service, 27 Sep 99; 
via lexis-nexis) In the latest moves, the Russian government has discussed 
options for introducing a visa regime with Azerbaijan and establishing some sort 
of control over Azeri citizens in Russia, as well as restricting money transfers to 
Azerbaijan (thereby affecting the livelihood of thousands of Azeri families whose 
only source of income are the sums sent from Russia by relatives).  
 
In Moscow, Mayor Luzhkov has already taken steps to establish internal control 
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by signing an order demanding that all “visitors” re-register with the authorities; 
police comb the streets and check documents. Masked police officers reportedly 
are grabbing dark-skinned men from their stalls in open-air markets and dragging 
them away. (The Gazette (Montreal), 26 Sep 99; via lexis-nexis) This increased 
pressure on the community, which stops just short of open deportation, may at 
some point lead to more violence if the level of police brutality becomes 
intolerable. Taking into account the numbers of Azeris in Russia and the fact that 
they are predominantly young males, such reaction may add another factor of 
instability in a very unstable Russia. Another possibility is that a mass exodus of 
Azeris from Russian may occur.  
 
It seems that the Azeri community in Russia is being used to exert pressure on 
the Azeri government to prevent any potential support for the Chechens, 
although there is no factual basis to support Russia's allegations of Azeri aid to 
Chechnya. The Azerbaijani government repeatedly has said that it supports 
Russia's territorial integrity. Discrediting the current Azeri government is another 
possible outcome of these policies. However, significant destabilization of 
Azerbaijan could result in an unpredictable outcome. While Russia may hope that 
such destabilization would produce a more friendly regime in Azerbaijan, the 
example of Iran in 1979 shows that such situations are unpredictable and 
unmanageable. Russia exerts influence over Azerbaijan through the economic 
lever of allowing the Azeri business people to operate in Moscow and other cities. 
If these people leave, Azerbaijan will be destabilized, but Russia will also lose, 
because it will have wasted its leverage.  
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